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Cohesion is one the European Union’s objectives, 
along with growth and stability. In the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), however, these objectives are 
only targeted by ineffective coordination frameworks 
and small spending programmes. Economic 
integration was meant to be a source of economic 
growth and efficiency, particularly through market-size 
and product diversity effects. It was also supposed to 
promote cultural and institutional convergence across 
countries, as well as imitation and competition among 
policy systems. Relatively little attention was paid 
to the effects of international market integration on 
income inequality within countries, despite its obvious 
political relevance. In all industrialised countries, and 
especially in continental European ones, welfare state 
policies are far more extensive than the European 
Union’s structural, cohesion, and social funds. At a 
share of a European Union’s 
budget that hovers around 
1 percent of aggregate income, 
the latter are hardly significant 
compared to national social 
protection expenditure which, 
even excluding pensions, 
amount to some 10-20 percent 
of income in member countries.
This article focuses on the 
implications of international 
economic integration for 
inequality among each 
nation’s citizens; and for 
national policies that influence 
inequality in politico-economic 
equilibrium. Empirically, the 
closer economic integration 
implied by EMU was associated, 
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on average, with higher intra-country inequality. 
Around that trend, member countries’ inequality 
indicators display wide swings that are correlated with 
country-specific average income changes, and are 
largely symmetric before and after the crisis. Simple 
theoretical mechanisms can explain these phenomena 
as a straightforward implication of EMU’s institutional 
configuration. While unsurprising in hindsight, higher 
inequality is problematic, and not what European 
citizens expected from EMU. Market integration and 
policy competition may well improve efficiency and 
help to achieve economic growth objectives, but their 
inequality implications make it more difficult to achieve 
political stability and social cohesion at the member 
country level.
This article reviews the message conveyed by 
the data, refers to broader evidence, while outlining 
theoretical explanations of the facts, and concludes by 
discussing their institutional and political relevance.
A FEW FACTS
Figure 1 plots population-weighted averages of a 
standard country-specific inequality indicator against 
time, separately for the group of countries that joined 
the Eurozone early1 and for the other mostly developed 
1 This group includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, 













1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Euro area 12
Other countries
Population-weighted Averages of Gini Coefficients of Disposable Income Inequality
Source: Solt (2016). ©  ifo Institute 




CESifo Forum 2 / 2018 June Volume 19
countries2 included in the Solt (2016) database. In 
the first group inequality was on average stable or 
decreasing in the 1990s, and subsequently began to 
increase quickly. The figure also plots the difference 
in average inequality in the two groups. Inequality is, 
on average, always lower in the continental European 
countries that form the bulk of the Eurozone than in the 
comparison group of countries that did not integrate as 
tightly. However, the difference becomes narrower as 
of 2005 and, especially, after the 2008 crisis.
Figure 2 plots the 1998–2015 paths of country-
specific average income and income inequality for 
the countries that adopted the euro around 2000 
(Luxembourg is omitted). It conveys an impression of 
large and heterogeneous changes that, like the sharply 
increasing path of average inequality in Figure 1, is not 
good news for anybody who hoped EMU would foster 
cohesion.
Figure 3 isolates some changes in the same data 
over two periods. The top panel starts when the euro 
was first adopted and stops just before the crisis; the 
bottom panel covers the crisis. There are, of course, 
many explanations for aggregate income and income 
inequality dynamics at the country level. Finland is 
similar to other Northern European countries in many 
respects, but was recovering from a deep crisis when 
it joined the Eurozone; the pre-crisis boom was cut 
short much sooner in Portugal than in other peripheral 
countries; the crisis was asymmetric and so was 
recovery across countries; and the data only imper- 
fectly measure the phenomena of interest (average 
income is particularly difficult to measure and inter- 
pret in Ireland, where multinational operations 
would imply a very sharp GDP increase if the post-
crisis period were to include 2015). But the broad-
brush picture painted in Figure 3 suggests that 
2 Australia, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United States.
changes in income averages 
and inequalities are often 
related. In the top panel some 
countries, notably Germany, 
experience both relatively 
slow growth and a relatively 
large increase in inequality; 
while the opposite is true of 
other countries like Spain 
and Greece. The bottom 
panel shows a broad reversal 
in fortunes: during the crisis 
Germany’s income levels and 
inequality were relatively 
stable, while Greece and Spain 
suffered not only large output 
declines, but also increasing 
inequality.
A relevant source of 
variation for the data displayed in the figures must be 
the impact of international economic integration on 
average incomes and their inequality. Some of these 
effects are complicated and ambiguous. When markets 
operate across national borders, new types of shock 
and new channels of adjustment become relevant. 
Growth and inequality developments are the result 
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developments, and of globalization, which had 
different implications for countries that within Europe 
specialized in sectors that compete with or are 
complementary to those where emerging countries 
have a comparative advantage. 
In the Eurozone’s experience, however, the initially 
tighter international integration of financial and other 
markets implied and the disintegration triggered by the 
crisis did, in interesting respects, conform to the less 
ambiguous theoretical implications, discussed next, 
of international economic integration for personal 
income distribution when production factors are 
distributed unevenly across and within countries.
THE DIRECT INEQUALITY IMPACT OF 
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION
In the absence of other distortions, the removal of 
international market barriers would certainly benefit 
‘representative’ individuals who own factors in 
each country’s average proportion: in undistorted 
markets exchanges are voluntary, hence they must be 
beneficial. Within each country, however, international 
factor mobility or factor reallocation between import 
and export sectors lowers the market income of factors 
that were scarcer in autarky. Redistributing the gains 
from trade would, in principle, make it possible to allow 
all individuals to benefit from economic integration. 
In practice, doing so would require unrealistically 
detailed information and policy instruments. Hence, 
international economic integration changes the 
distribution of income distribution across individuals 
who own different factors in different proportions 
within each country, and may very well damage 
individuals who mostly own factors that are less scarce 
in the integrated economy than in autarky. International 
markets increase the incomes of hypothetical country-
specific representative individuals, but also raise or 
lower the incomes of many real-life individuals.
Gainers and losers are not the same in different 
countries and different historical contexts, and 
international economic integration may increase or 
decrease inequality in specific countries. In the 19th 
century, intercontinental trade made land less scarce 
and reduced rich landlords’ income and benefitted 
labourers in European economies (O’Rourke 2001). 
In the more recent wave of globalisation, integration 
with poorer countries plausibly increased inequality in 
rich countries, as their poor citizens’ incomes were bid 
down by competition from workers in poor countries. 
Inequality in most advanced countries did begin to 
increase towards the end of the 20th century, rever- 
sing a previous declining trend. This pattern broadly 
parallels that of global economic integration indica- 
tors, but it is difficult to identify the effects of econo- 
mic integration separately from those of technologi- 
cal change. On the one hand, this is because the 
extent of economic integration is shaped by progress 
in transportation and communication technologies, 
as well as by trade liberalization and other policy 
trends. On the other hand, it is due to the fact that the 
two phenomena have similar effects on the distribu- 
tion of incomes in advanced countries.
The sharp and precisely-timed economic 
integration implied by EMU offers an opportunity to 
observe its implications more clearly. Factor prices can 
influence personal income inequality through a variety 
of economic integration channels: not only trade and 
migration, but also capital flows, which stand out clearly 
in early EMU data. Differences in capital abundance, 
rooted in historical experience and in demographic 
and other determinants of savings rates, triggered not 
only new opportunities for trade in goods with different 
factor contents, but also highly visible financial flows, 
as capital went ‘downhill’ towards economies where its 
relative scarcity offered higher returns. Labour is less 
mobile than capital and ownership of the latter is more 
concentrated. If wealth is more unequally distributed 
than other income sources within each country, theory 
predicts that inequality should increase in capital-rich 
countries, where wealthier individuals can enjoy the 
higher rate of return offered by investment in capital-
poor countries, and that it should decline in countries 
where capital inflows bid down returns on wealth 
and raise wages and employment. In the early 2000s 
increasing income inequality was indeed positively and 
significantly associated with current account surpluses 
not only in Germany, but more generally across EMU 
member countries (Bertola 2013 and 2016).
FROM INTEGRATION TO INEQUALITY THROUGH 
POLICY
To interpret the evidence, it is important to consider 
the implications of economic integration not only for 
market income inequality directly, but also for the 
policies that aim to reduce income inequality in each 
country, and in EMU continue to do so independently, 
even as markets integrate.
In Figure 2 above, inequality tends to be lower in 
 EMU member countries with higher per capita income. 
In this group, and more generally, policy reduces 
inequality more strongly in richer countries: for 
example, social protection expenditure as a percent of 
GDP is positively correlated with per capita GDP, and 
negatively related to inequality (see Bertola 2010b). 
While some redistributive policies may increase 
productivity at the same time as they reduce risk 
and inequality (a welfare safety net may encourage 
entrepreneurial innovation, and job security may 
similarly give appropriate risk-taking incentives to 
employees), a more plausible explanation for the 
more generous welfare policies of richer countries is 
that higher income makes it easier to afford the luxury 
of more extensive redistribution at the cost of lower 
production efficiency.
Focusing on factor incomes as a determinant of 
personal income distribution offers sharp insights not 
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only into the direct impact of economic integration on 
inequality but also into its implications for redistribu- 
tion policies. Given that labour income is less con-
centrated than other factor incomes, it is a more 
important income source for relatively poor house-
holds. Thus, policies that shift income towards labour 
and away from other factors reduce inequality. For 
example, a wage floor increases worker welfare as long 
as higher wages are not offset by lower employment 
along the labour demand curve, and reduces inequa-
lity at a price in terms not only of employment, but 
also of total production and capital returns. Other 
‘passive’ policies (like unemployment insurance, 
worktime regulation and employment protection) 
have similar effects. They are more prevalent than 
symmetric ‘active’ policies (like in-work employment 
subsidies), and this can be explained by democratic 
decision processes that give a greater weight to the 
many citizens who predominantly earn labour income 
than to the relatively small number of wealthy voters.
While competition in well-regulated markets 
fosters efficiency, competition among policymakers 
can make policies ineffective (Sinn 2003). To see how 
international economic integration interacts with 
national policies that shift income towards workers and 
reduce capital returns, note that higher wages exact 
higher employment prices if capital can move across 
country borders seeking higher returns. The resulting 
race-to-bottom pressure on competing policies makes 
them gravitate towards the competitive deregulated 
equilibrium.
Empirical evidence on policy reactions to economic 
integration can be gathered by comparing countries 
that did and did not adopt the euro before and after 
the event, which was indeed associated with the 
significantly faster deregulation of product markets, 
some deregulation of their labour markets, and lower 
social policy expenditure. In the data, the faster growth 
of disposable income inequality illustrated in Figure 1 
above, and different employment and unemployment 
developments, are statistically accounted for not by 
economic integration per se, but by its association with 
changes in labour and social policy indicators (Bertola 
2010a and 2010b).
These developments, however, were uneven 
across countries. After the adoption of the euro, 
Germany’s Hartz reforms quickly brought its labour 
market towards the deregulated ‘bottom’. Other 
Eurozone members implemented less drastic reforms, 
and some reduced their labour market flexibility. A 
useful summary indicator of these developments 
is the LABREF database developed at the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs at the initiative of the Labour Market 
Working Group attached to the Economic Policy 
Committee of the ECOFIN Council in 2005, and currently 
maintained by the staff of the Directorate General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. It contains 
a classification of measures in a variety of areas and 
an indicator of how each influences labour market 
flexibility. A cumulative count of these indicators 
provides a time-varying measure of each country’s 
reform stance.
The top panel of Figure 4 shows that before the 
crisis labour markets were deregulated more in 
countries that accumulated positive external 
imbalances, and also tended to display relatively 
slower average income growth in the top panel of 
Figure 3, than in countries where capital inflows 
financed some private or public consumption growth 
and large investment booms. The bottom panel 
of Figure 4 shows that reform patterns are largely 
symmetric before and after 2008. As with the output 
and inequality patterns in the bottom panel of 
Figure 3, reform patterns also reversed when the 
financial and euro crises reversed the previous 
integration trends.
Bertola (2017) analyses these patterns in greater 
detail and documents them for other policy indicators 
too; while Bertola (2016) offers a simple politico-
economic explanation for these observations. In EMU 
wealth differs across countries as well as within them 
individually, and labour market regulation is chosen to 
benefit individuals who draw relatively more income 
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countries, such individuals are poor relative to their 
compatriots’ average, but become less poor when 
the market that employs their labour and capital is 
extended to include capital-poor countries. So, the 
politico-economic equilibrium in Germany, for ins-
tance, should and did swing towards deregulation more 
strongly than in Spain, for example, where politically-
decisive individuals become even more capital-poor. 
As EMU allowed capital to move more easily across 
the boundaries of countries with independent labour 
policies, reforms were related to the countries’ different 
capital intensities, and associated with international 
financial imbalances as capital flowed towards higher 
returns.
Both divergent reforms and downhill capital 
movements were completely natural consequences 
of financial integration and policy subsidiarity; both 
increased inequality in countries that experienced 
capital outflows and decreased it in countries that 
accumulate negative international imbalances; and 
both were reversed when the financial crisis made it 
more difficult and less appealing for rich countries’ 
savings to fund poorer countries’ investment and 
consumption.
ON THE INTERACTION OF MARKETS AND POLICIES
Remarkably, economic integration in Europe moved 
inequality through policy in the same direction as 
markets did: in countries where market-income 
inequality was increasing, labour market deregulation 
and the decreasing generosity of welfare policies 
did nothing to keep it in check. As explained above, 
economic integration has obvious implications for 
inequality and for the politico-economic determination 
of country-specific policies that reduce inequality. But 
these developments are politically uncomfortable in 
relatively rich countries, where integration may well 
benefit the country on average, but damage politically 
crucial, lower-middle-class voters. 
As Figure 3 above shows, increasing inequality 
has often been associated with countries that have 
relatively slow per capita income growth. Growing 
inequalities within and across countries challenge 
the political sustainability of EMU, if they result from, 
or are perceived to result from economic integration, 
and if politico-economic equilibrium policies fail to 
remedy them. Income inequality across countries 
increases when national government budgets cannot 
buffer asymmetric shocks (Bertola 2013), and relatively 
poor workers within each country may suffer the 
consequences not only of capital outflows, but also of 
country-specific reforms that reduce the generosity of 
social policy and make labour markets more flexible.
Before EMU, a single market with multiple 
currencies was disturbed by devaluations because 
uncoordinated macroeconomic policies, fixed 
exchange rates, and free capital mobility were mutually 
inconsistent. EMU is similarly disturbed by reforms 
of its multiple social and labour policies because 
market integration, subsidiary policies, and politically 
acceptable inequality also form an inconsistent 
trinity. In principle, supranational policy stabilisers 
(like a European unemployment insurance scheme) or 
effective policy coordination (that would control the 
excesses of both deregulation and re-regulation) could 
keep the centrifugal forces and tensions arising from 
exposure to systems competition between politically 
crucial policies in check. In practice, harmonising 
social and labour policies would be much more 
difficult than even adopting a single currency was. The 
member countries of EMU pursue similar distributional 
objectives using a large variety of different instruments, 
and it would be both politically and technically difficult 
to design a supranational scheme that could replace, 
or be added to, the respective historically-determined 
welfare states of member countries with very different 
administrative capacities and heterogeneous political 
majorities.
European integration was exceptionally supported 
by a mutual interest in preserving peace through the 
convergence of institutions, cultures, and policies. 
Other economic gains (like economies of scale and 
diversity) and non-economic motives (like a desire to 
achieve consensus on German reunification) had to play 
a significant role in making integration with capital-
poor countries politically acceptable in relatively rich 
countries, where a democratic majority of relatively 
poor workers could expect to be damaged by capital 
outflows and labour market reforms. In countries that 
suffered from financial disintegration during the crisis, 
hopes of a quick return to better times were similarly 
necessary for EMU to survive resentment on the part of 
relatively poor workers.
Economic integration is not robust, however, if 
it perturbs national income distribution issues that 
cannot be addressed by supranational policy action 
and political processes. It is hard to formulate 
compromises among contrasting interests across 
the boundaries of member countries when policies 
designed to cope with country-specific industriali- 
zation are challenged by international market 
integration, but political interactions still take place 
mostly at the national level. A solution to this thorny 
set of problems is not easy to find, but none will ever 
be found unless the issues arising from the interaction 
of international market integration and inequality 
concerns are recognised and analysed clearly.
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